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Calculating the ideal compensation for plaintiffs' attorneys in
class actions is difficult. When plaintiffs bring suit individually (rather
than as members of a class), they usually set their attorneys' fees by
contract before the attorneys provide any services.' In contrast, it is
impossible for a plaintiff class to contract with its attorneys before fil-
ing suit. This is because a class cannot be certified, and therefore can-
not exist, until after suit is filed' through the initiative of entrepreneu-
rial attorneys.' Thus, attorneys' fees in class actions are inevitably set
by the court after settlement or trial rather than before the case be-
gins.' Frequently, plaintiffs' attorneys are compensated for their time,
effort, and risk out of a "common fund" created for the benefit of the
class.6
After settlement or judgment in the class's favor, several consid-
erations militate in favor of compensating the attorneys generously,
including the effective enforcement of laws, the work necessary to
overcome the low incentives for any of the numerous class members
to sue individually, and the substantial uncertainty of success.' But
t B.A. 1999, Indiana University; J.D. Candidate 2002,The University of Chicago.
1 See Janet Cooper Alexander, Contingent Fees and Class Actions, 47 DePaul L Rev 347,
347-48 (1998) (distinguishing method of compensation in class actions from individual contin-
gent fee cases).
2 See id at 348.
3 See FRCP 23 (FRCP 23(c)(1) directs: "As soon as practicable after the commencement
of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so
maintained.").
4 See Alexander, 47 DePaul L Rev at 348 (cited in note 1) (noting that in class actions
"entrepreneurial lawyers bring the case and the class into being on the prospect of an eventual
fee based on a large aggregate recovery").
5 One commentator summarizes the pivotal role of class counsel as follows:
In a typical class action, a law firm will (1) craft a potential cause of action ... (2) move to
define and certify a class of injured plaintiffs, (3) petition a court for approval to represent
the class, and (4) prosecute the case through settlement or trial. Every step of this labor-
intensive process will have been undertaken with no explicit advance agreement with any-
one about what the terms of attorney compensation are to be. Those terms are generally
defined only after the fact by the court.
William J. Lynk, The Courts and the Plaintiffs' Bar: Awarding the Attorney's Fee in Class-Action
Litigation, 23 J Legal Stud 185, 185 (1994).
6 See Part II.B.
7 See, for example, Amchem Products, Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591,617 (1997) (stating that
"[t]he policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that
1007
The University of Chicago Law Review
equally important factors line up on the other side. For example, the
absence of many of the plaintiffs from the litigation means that, with-
out control by the court, the attorneys can easily act in their own fi-
nancial interests rather than those of their clients.8 Given these com-
peting considerations, setting the right attorneys' fees is bound to be
complex in any class action.
But the problem becomes even thornier in a "hybrid"9 class ac-
tion-a class action initiated under a statute that has a fee-shifting
provision. Statutory fee-shifting provisions allow courts to order losing
parties to pay the prevailing parties' attorneys' fees.'" The method
courts normally use to calculate fees under such statutes differs from
the prevailing method for calculating fees in simple class actions." Be-
cause of the differences between these methods, statutory fees can fall
far short of fees in simple class actions.
If there were no way to avoid the lower statutory fee, plaintiffs'
attorneys might stop bringing hybrid class actions altogether; they
would bring class actions only under statutes that lack fee-shifting
provisions. But there is sometimes a way to circumvent these statutes:
settlement. Since many fee-shifting provisions are activated only after
one party "prevails,"" some settlements may permit courts to award
fees according to simple class action fee principles rather than under
the statute." The result is an enormous incentive for plaintiffs' attor-
neys in hybrid class actions to settle, possibly at the expense of their
dispersed, and often unknown, clients. Since the fee structure makes
plaintiffs' attorneys prefer settlement rather than trial, they presuma-
small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecut-
ing his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry poten-
tial recoveries into something worth someone's (usually an attorney's) labor."), quoting Mace v
Van Ru Credit Corp, 109 F3d 338,344 (7th Cir 1997).
Scholars have described the class action procedure's objectives as follows:
The class action procedure serves a number of objectives: It conserves social resources by
consolidating many similar cases in a single proceeding, enables persons with small claims
to obtain a hearing on their grievances that would otherwise not be economically feasible,
and facilitates compensation for large numbers of injured persons. Class actions also serve
deterrent purposes.
Geoffrey P. Miller and Lori S. Singer, Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements, 60 L & Contemp
Probs 97,98 (Autumn 1997).
8 See Miller and Singer, 60 L & Contemp Probs at 98 (cited in note 7) (stating that "critics
of the process charge that class suits often take the form of meritless nuisance litigation filed
solely to obtain a settlement offer, and that such suits are brought by plaintiffs attorneys whose
primary motive is to settle the case for a high fee, even at the class's expense").
9 In this Comment, a "hybrid" class action is a class action initiated under a statute with a
fee-shifting provision but that settles or reaches judgment, creating a common fund.
10 See Part L.A for an explanation of statutory fee shifting.
11 See Part II for a discussion of the methods of fee calculation.
12 See Part I.A.
13 See Part I.A.2.
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bly settle valuable cases for a lower amount per plaintiff than they
would demand if they tried the cases."
Plaintiff classes' attorneys already have a huge incentive to settle
because trying a class action requires tremendous resources.5 In fact,
from society's perspective, settlement can sometimes be more favor-
able than trial because the resources of the judicial system are lim-
ited." However, the expected recovery for the plaintiffs, rather than
the expected compensation of their attorneys, should be the determi-
native factor in the decision between settlement and trial. The current
rules for setting fees in hybrid cases create incentives for plaintiffs' at-
torneys that are too heavily tilted toward settlement. This bias will
lower recoveries for plaintiff classes.
This Comment proposes that the rules for setting fees in hybrid
cases should better align the incentives of plaintiffs' attorneys with
those of their clients. Courts should presume that the reasonable fee
for a successful plaintiffs' attorney in a hybrid case is the fee that
would have been set in a simple class action, and that the statutory fee
establishes a minimum but not a maximum amount.
7 If this presump-
tion is established, attorneys will still be inclined to settle to avoid ex-
pending vast resources at trial. But at least they will not settle solely
because the fee-shifting statutes make settlement more lucrative than
winning a large judgment for the class.
Part I explains statutory fee shifting and the common fund doc-
trine-the two exceptions to the usual rule for paying attorneys in
America that combine in hybrid class actions. Part II describes the
lodestar and the percentage methods of calculating fees, which corre-
spond roughly to statutory fee-shifting and the common fund doctrine.
Part III explains how problems arise when the two methods combine
in hybrid cases. Part IV proposes the solution: a presumption that the
percentage method establishes a reasonable minimum fee.
I. EXCEPTIONS TO THE AMERICAN RULE
Under the "English Rule," followed in the civil courts of many
countries, a prevailing litigant is entitled to recover attorneys' fees
from her opponent.'" In contrast, the usual practice in America con-
14 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 627 (Aspen 5th ed 1998) (stating that
"[the lawyer for the class will be tempted to offer to settle with the defendant for a small judg-
ment and a large legal fee, and such an offer will be attractive to the defendant, provided the sum
of the two figures is less than the defendant's net expected loss from going to trial").
15 See notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
16 See In re General Motors Corp Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation,
55 F3d 768, 784-85 (3d Cir 1995) (noting that "the law favors settlement" to conserve judicial re-
sources, but that the interests of the absentee class members must be protected).
17 See Part IV for a discussion of this solution.
18 See James Wm. Moore, 10 Moore's Federal Practice § 54.170 at 54-245 to 46 (Matthew
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cerning attorneys' fees is that attorneys are paid according to contract
with their clients. Win or lose, litigants bear their own expenses. This is
known as the "American Rule."'9 However, the rule has a number of
exceptions. In these cases, courts may award attorneys' fees to a pre-
vailing party.'° Two significant exceptions are statutory fee-shifting
provisions and the equitable common fund doctrine. This Part explains
the different rationales for these two exceptions to the American
Rule, as well as the conflict of interest between attorneys and clients
that may arise under the common fund doctrine but not under statu-
tory fee shifting.
A. Statutory Fee Shifting
One exception to the American Rule is statutory fee shifting.
Many federal statutes (over 150 as of 1995"), dealing with a host of
topics, include fee-shifting provisions under which courts may order
one party to pay another party's attorneys' fees. Many statutory fee-
shifting provisions explicitly require that only a successful or prevail-
ing party may receive an award of fees," although not all do.3
Bender 3d ed 2000) (contrasting the English and American Rules).
19 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv Co v Wilderness Society, 421 US 240,247 (1975) (stating "[i]n
the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attor-
neys' fee from the loser"); Herbert B. Newberg and Alba Conte, 3 Newberg on Class Actions
§ 14.01 at 14-1 (McGraw-Hill 3d ed 1992) (stating that "fuinder the American no-fee rule, a court
may not award fees to a prevailing party unless expressly authorized by statute").
20 See Federal Judicial Center, Manual for Complex Litigation (Third) § 24.11 at 186-87
(West 1995). The manual lists five principal situations in which court-awarded attorneys' fees are
appropriate: common fund cases (explained in Part I.A), statutory fee cases (explained in Part
I.B), designated counsel (chosen by the court to perform certain tasks, such as lead counsel, for a
group of litigants), special parties (the common law and many state statutes require courts to ap-
prove fees charged by counsel for minors, incompetents, and trusts), and sanctions (the common
law, 28 USC § 1927 (1994), and FRCP 11 authorize courts to award fees against offending par-
ties).
21 Federal Judicial Center, Manual for Complex Litigation § 24.11 at 186-87 (cited in note
20) (briefly discussing numerous statutes "ranging from antitrust and civil rights to little known
types of claims").
22 See, for example, Truth in Lending Act, 15 USC § 1640(a)(3) (1994) (authorizing pay-
ment "in the case of any successful action" against a creditor for noncompliance with the Act, in
the amount of "the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined
by the court") (emphasis added); Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Im-
provement Act, 15 USC § 2310(d)(2) (1994) (stating "[i]f a consumer finally prevails in any
[product liability] action" under the Act, the court may award "the aggregate amount of cost and
expenses (including attorneys' fees based on actual time expended) determined by the court to
have been reasonably incurred ... unless the court in its discretion shall determine that such an
award of attorneys' fees would be inappropriate") (emphasis added); Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 1976,42 USC § 1988(b) (1994) (stating "[i]n any action or proceeding to en-
force a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title [and several
other statutes] ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable at-
torney's fee as part of the costs") (emphasis added); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC
§ 2000a-3(b) (1994) (stating "[i]n any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter [prohibiting
discrimination in places of public accommodation], the court, in its discretion, may allow the pre-
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1. Purpose of statutory fee shifting.
The main justification for statutory fee shifting is to provide an
incentive for citizens to enforce certain laws as private attorneys gen-
eral," even if they face limited resources. Justice Blackmun wrote that
the rationale for fee-shifting provisions is "to strengthen the enforce-
ment of selected federal laws by ensuring that private persons seeking
to enforce those laws could retain competent counsel" even where po-
tential plaintiffs lack resources to hire an attorney. The legislative his-
tory of fee-shifting provisions confirms this assertion."
In cases featuring the possibility of significant monetary damages,
indigent plaintiffs can overcome their lack of resources and attract
competent attorneys through contingent fee arrangements. But if the
potential relief is insignificant damages or an injunction, this is impos-
vailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs") (emphasis added); Civil Rights
Act of 1964,42 USC § 2000e-5(k) (1994) (substantially identical wording for subchapter prohib-
iting discrimination in employment); Fair Housing Act, 42 USC § 3612(p) (1994) (stating that in
any case dealing with an alleged discriminatory housing practice, "the court ... in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee and costs") (emphasis added).
23 Some statutes give courts broad discretion to award attorneys' fees to either side with-
out an explicit determination of which side actually prevailed. See, for example, Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934,15 USC § 78i(e) (1994) (providing that in a suit under this Section, which au-
thorizes suits for manipulation of security prices, "the court may, in its discretion, require an un-
dertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit, and assess reasonable costs, including reason-
able attorneys' fees, against either party litigant"); 15 USC § 78r(a) (1994) (containing identical
wording in section authorizing suits for misleading statements); Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974,29 USC § 1132(g)(1) (1994) (stating "[i]n any action under this subchapter
[which deals with the protection of employee benefit rights] ... by a participant, beneficiary, or
fiduciary, the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to
either party"); Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7604(d) (1994) (stating "in issuing any final order" in a
citizen suit to enforce various provisions of the Act, the court "may award costs of litigation (in-
cluding reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court deter-
mines such award is appropriate").
24 For a general discussion of the private law enforcement rationale, see John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private En-
forcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum L Rev 669,669 (1986) (argu-
ing that enforcement hrough private attorneys general in American law "relies upon private liti-
gants to enforce substantive provisions of law that in other legal systems are left largely to the
discretion of public enforcement agencies").
25 City of Burlington v Dague, 505 US 557, 568 (1992) (Blackmun dissenting). See also
Pennsylvania v Delaware Valley Citizens' Counsel for Clean Air,483 US 711,725 (1987) (agreeing
that "a fundamental aim of such statutes is to make it possible for those who cannot pay a lawyer
for his time and effort to obtain competent counsel, this by providing lawyers with reasonable
fees to be paid by the losing defendants"); Brown v Phillips Petroleum Co, 838 F2d 451,454 (10th
Cir 1988) (noting that "statutory fees are intended to further a legislative purpose by punishing
the nonprevailing party and encouraging private parties to enforce substantive statutory rights").
26 See Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, S Rep No 94-1011, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 6
(1976), reprinted in 1976 USCCAN 5913 (explaining, in reference to the 1976 Act, that reason-
able attorneys' fees are "adequate to attract competent counsel, but ... do not produce windfalls
to attorneys").
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sible. In such cases, statutory fee shifting serves an important function,
21providing an incentive for law enforcement.
2. Circumstances in which fee shifting is appropriate.
Most fee-shifting statutes explicitly require that, to be eligible for
an award of attorneys' fees, a party must have "succeeded" or "pre-
vailed." 2 Some lack this explicit requirement, instead allowing the
court to award fees to, for example, "either party.,29 But regardless of
whether a fee-shifting statute explicitly uses the word "prevail," it does
not allow a court to shift fees to a losing party.° Thus, courts have im-
plied a "prevailing party" requirement into all fee-shifting statutes, re-
gardless of their specific wording.
The definition of "prevailing party" is unclear and has been the
subject of significant litigation. If a plaintiff wins a judgment on at
least some of the merits of his claims (as opposed to a purely proce-
dural or technical victory), he will be considered a prevailing party.3
The trickier question is deciding whether he has prevailed if he has
settled his claims or entered into a consent decree; or, even if the liti-
gation has reached no such formal legal conclusion, the defendant
may voluntarily change his conduct towards the plaintiff, mooting the
case.
The Supreme Court's latest pronouncement on the issue is Farrar
v Hobby. 3 There, the Court established a relatively vague test for pre-
vailing party status: "[A] plaintiff 'prevails' when actual relief on the
merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the
parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly
benefits the plaintiff."3 It then held that nominal damages modified
the defendant's behavior in favor of the plaintiff, since they forced the
27 See, for example, id at 2, reprinted in 1976 USCCAN 5909-10 (explaining that the "pur-
pose and effect" of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 is "to allow courts to
provide the familiar remedy of reasonable counsel fees to prevailing parties in suits to enforce
the civil rights acts .... [The acts] depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee awards
have proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vin-
dicate the important Congressional policies which these laws contain.").
28 See statutes cited in note 22. See also Moore, 10 Moore's Federal Practice § 54.170 at
54-245 to 46 (cited in note 18) (noting that fee-shifting statutes require the "loser" to pay the
prevailing party's attorneys' fees).
29 Securities Exchange Act of 1934,15 USC § 78i(e). See note 23.
30 See Ruckelshaus v Sierra Club, 463 US 680, 683-94 (1983) (holding that although the
provision in question of Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7607(f), authorized fees in "appropriate" cases
rather than requiring a party to have prevailed, it did not allow a court to shift fees to a plaintiff
who lost on the merits of all claims).
31 See Hewitt v Helms, 482 US 755,760 (1987) (requiring at least "some relief' on the mer-
its of a claim for prevailing party status).
32 506 US 103 (1992).
33 Idat 111-12.
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defendant to pay money that he otherwise would not pay, so the plain-
tiff was a prevailing party" However, it declined to award any attor-
neys' fees because the plaintiff had recovered an insignificant amount
(nominal damages of one dollar after requesting seventeen million
dollars in compensatory damages)."
Farrar was a case that reached a jury verdict, but the Court noted
that final judgment was not necessary for prevailing party status: "The
plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant
... or comparable relief through a consent decree or settlement."'" In
an earlier case, Maher v Gagne,37 the Court held that a civil rights
plaintiff who entered into a settlement and consent decree was a pre-
vailing party even though the case did not reach judgment."
Thus, it is possible for a plaintiff to be considered the prevailing
party even after settling rather than trying his case. However, in
Maher the consent decree afforded the plaintiff "substantially all" of
the relief originally sought)9 In contrast, settlements may fail to confer
prevailing party status on the plaintiff if the defendant has agreed to
settle purely because of the nuisance value of the suit.'° Compared to a
judgment, a settlement is less certain to confer prevailing party status
on the plaintiff.
Besides judgment or settlement, a final scenario in which the
plaintiff may obtain prevailing party status (and therefore trigger
statutory fee shifting) occurs if his suit is the "catalyst" for unilateral
action by the defendant that moots the suit." However, to be consid-
ered prevailing, the plaintiff must prove that his suit actually caused
the defendant's favorable action, and this can be difficult to show."
This is a significant obstacle to prevailing party status under the cata-
lyst theory. In addition, the catalyst theory may not survive much
longer. Farrar cast doubt on the theory when it stated that o be con-
34 Idat 113.
35 Id at 114-16.
36 Id at ill.
37 448 US 122 (1980).
38 Id at 129 (stating "[tihe fact that respondent prevailed through a settlement rather than
through litigation does not weaken her claim to fees").
39 Id at 127.
40 See Texas State Teachers Association v Garland Independent School District, 489 US 782,
792 (1989) (noting that prevailing party status may be denied "[w]here the plaintiffs success on a
legal claim can be characterized as purely technical or de minimis"), citing Chicano Police Offi-
cer's Association v Stover, 624 F2d 127, 131 (10th Cir 1980) (stating that "[n]uisance settlements,
of course, should not give rise to a 'prevailing' plaintiff').
41 See Hewitt, 482 US at 760-61 (stating that if the suit generates "a change in conduct that
redresses the plaintiffs grievances ... the plaintiff is deemed to have prevailed despite the ab-
sence of a formal judgment in his favor"), citing Maher, 448 US at 129.
42 See, for example, Hooper v Demco, Inc, 37 F3d 287, 293 (7th Cir 1994) (holding that
plaintiff did not prevail because defendant's action was gratuitous); Craig v Gregg County, 988
F2d 18,21 (5th Cir 1993) (holding that plaintiff failed to show causation).
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sidered prevailing, the plaintiff must obtain a judgment or comparable
consent decree or settlement.4'3 This statement can be read to exclude
the catalyst theory as an additional means of gaining prevailing party
status. It generated a circuit split,44 and the Supreme Court has granted
certiorari on the issue.5
To summarize, if a party wins a judgment on the merits, she has
prevailed and the fee-shifting provision is activated. If a party settles,
it is less clear that she has prevailed, and the fee-shifting provision
may or may not operate, depending on the relief the settlement pro-
vides. Finally, if the defendant unilaterally changes its conduct, the
plaintiff must meet the causation requirement of the catalyst theory in
order to obtain prevailing party status; and the continuing validity of
the catalyst theory is doubtful. In short, the only way to ensure pre-
vailing party status, and thus to ensure the operation of a fee-shifting
statute, is to win a final judgment on the merits.
B. The Common Fund Doctrine
Another exception to the American Rule is the common fund
doctrine. The doctrine allows a court to distribute attorneys' fees from
the common fund that is created for the satisfaction of class members'
claims when a class action reaches settlement or judgment."
Unlike fee shifting, which is authorized by statute, the common
fund doctrine is a traditional equitable practice. In addition, its ra-
tionale differs from that of fee shifting. The doctrine is grounded in
the principles of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, in two
senses. First, the doctrine prevents unjust enrichment of absent mem-
bers of the class at the expense of the attorneys. It is meant to com-
pensate the attorneys in proportion to the benefit they have obtained
43 506 Us at 111.
44 Compare Morris v City of West Palm Beach, 194 F3d 1203, 1206-07 (11th Cir 1999)
(holding that the catalyst test remains valid after Farrar), with S-1 and S-2 v State Board of Edu-
cation, 21 F3d 49, 51 (4th Cir 1994) (en banc) (determining that the catalyst test is no longer vi-
able).
45 See Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc v West Virginia Department of Health and
Human Resources, 121 S Ct 28 (2000).
46 See Sprague v Ticonic National Bank, 307 US 161,164 (1939) (holding that the authority
to award fees from the common fund stems from the "historic equity jurisdiction of the federal
courts"); Central Railroad & Banking Co of Georgia v Pettus, 113 US 116, 124 (1885) (allowing
payment from the common fund of "all expenses properly incurred in the preparation and con-
duct of the suit, including ... reasonable attorney's fees"); Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Fund v Greenough, 105 US 527,533 (1881) (same).
47 See Skelton v General Motors Corp, 860 F2d 250, 252 (7th Cir 1988) (collecting prece-
dent and stating "when a case results in the creation of a common fund for the benefit of a plain-
tiff class, a court will exercise its equitable powers to award plaintiffs' attorneys' fees out of the
fund").
48 See Lynk, 23 J Legal Stud at 186 & n 3 (cited in note 5) (describing the "novelty" of the
common fund doctrine and differentiating it from fee shifting).
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for the entire class (the fund), not just the representative members
with whom they have contracted." Under the doctrine, the amount of
the attorneys' compensation often depends on the size of the fund.
Second, the doctrine prevents the unjust enrichment of absent
class members at the expense of the class representatives." In the ab-
sence of the doctrine, only the present members, who hired the attor-
neys, would have to pay attorneys' fees, while all the members, both
absent and present, would enjoy the benefits of the settlement or
judgment. The members who did not hire the attorneys would be un-
justly enriched at the xpense of those who did.
C. Conflicts of Interest under the Common Fund Doctrine and
Statutory Fee Shifting
An important difference between the two exceptions discussed
above is who pays the attorneys. Under statutory fee shifting the loser
pays the fees, while under the common fund doctrine the victorious
class pays them. This generates a corresponding difference in the relief
that the winners ultimately receive. Under fee shifting, the court
awards fees in addition to whatever primary relief it grants the plain-
tiffs, and the amount of fees does not change the amount or type of
the plaintiffs' relief. In contrast, under the common fund doctrine, as
fees are subtracted from the fund, the amount available to satisfy class
members' claims diminishes. The size of the fees therefore affects the
size of the class members' relief.2
49 See Lindy Bros Builders, Inc of Philadelphia v American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp, 487 F2d 161, 165 (3d Cir 1973) (holding the attorney entitled to funds under the equitable
fund doctrine because he "conferred a benefit on all the class members, [one or more of whom]
agreed by contract to pay for the benefit the attorney conferred upon him, and that the remain-
ing class members should pay what the court determines to be the reasonable value of the ser-
vices benefiting them").
50 The connection between the size of the fund and the size of the fees is especially appar-
ent if the percentage method, explained in Part II.B, is used to calculate the fee, but can also be
seen in the use of multipliers to enhance the lodestar (explained in Part II.A).
51 See Brytus v Spang & Co, 203 F3d 238, 242 (3d Cir 2000) (stating "[t]he doctrine ...
,rests on the perception that persons who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without contributing to
its cost are unjustly enriched at the successful litigant's expense'), quoting Boeing Co v Van
Gemert, 444 US 472, 478 (1980); Lindy, 487 F2d at 165 (noting that the class representative can
claim "that by instituting the suit he has performed a service benefiting other class members. The
reasonable value of that service is measured by the expenses incurred by the plaintiff on behalf
of the class.").
52 See Court Awarded Attorney Fees: Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 FRD 237,
255 (3rd Cir 1985):
[w]hen a class action lawyer secures a recovery for his clients and then proceeds to file a fee
petition seeking compensation from those very same funds ... the plaintiffs' attorney's role
changes from one of a fiduciary for the clients to that of a claimant against the fund created
for the clients' benefit.
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Thus, payment of attorneys' fees under the common fund doc-
trine presents a conflict of interest between attorneys and clients that
statutory fee shifting does not generate.3 This is an age-old conflict,
but courts have tolerated it to avoid unjust enrichment of class mem-
bers at the expense of the one filing suit." Under fee shifting, the
plaintiffs' attorney remains the advocate of his clients and an adver-
sary of the defendant throughout the trial, including the fee-setting
phase. But under the common fund doctrine, the defendant is indiffer-
ent to the distribution of the fund as long as the fund discharges all of
its obligations. So the adversarial relationship between the plaintiffs'
attorney and the defendant disappears. Instead, the plaintiffs' attorney
and the plaintiffs are left to fight over the division of the fund. This
necessitates special care on the part of courts allocating common
funds."
II. METHODS OF FEE CALCULATION
This Part explains the methods courts use to calculate fees." The
primary method for calculating fees under statutory provisions is the
lodestar, explained in Section A. Courts applying the common fund
doctrine use either the lodestar or the percentage-of-the-fund method
to calculate fees, but more frequently employ the percentage method,
as described in Section B.
53 See id (noting that the conflict of interest that arises in the common fund context does
not "arise in the statutory fee context, which continues to be an adversary proceeding until reso-
lution").
54 See note 51.
55 See In re The Prudential Insurance Co ofAmerica Sales Practices Litigation, 148 F3d 283
(3d Cir 1998), which observed:
[A] thorough judicial review of fee applications is required in all class action settlements.
When parties are negotiating settlements, the court must always be mindful of the danger
... that the lawyers might urge a class settlement at a low figure or on a less-than-optimal
basis in exchange for red-carpet reatment for fees.
Id at 333. But see Susan P. Koniak and George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 Va L
Rev 1051, 1089 (1996) (arguing that the fairness hearings courts conduct before approving set-
tlements do "not appear adequate to prevent [abuse by lawyers]").
56 For a general discussion of fee awards under fee-shifting provisions and the common
fund doctrine, see Alexander, 47 DePaul L Rev at 347 (cited in note 1) (discussing in particular
awards in mass tort litigation); Stanley M. Grossman, Statutory Fee Shifting in Civil Rights Class
Actions: Incentive or Liability?, 39 Ariz L Rev 587,590-91 (1997) (discussing differences between
fee-shifting and common fund calculations); Judith Resnick, Dennis E. Curtis, and Deborah R.
Hensler, Individuals within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 NYU L Rev
296, 339-45 (1996) (same); Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Incentives to Comply with the Law,
46 Vand L Rev 1069, 1103-06 (1993) (same).
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A. Statutory Fee Shifting: The Lodestar
Courts determine a "reasonable" fee under fee-shifting provi-
sions by the lodestar method," originally developed by the Third Cir-
cuit. To calculate the prevailing counsel's lodestar, a court multiplies
the amount of time reasonably expended on the litigation by a rea-
sonable hourly rate,59 usually the prevailing market rate in the relevant
community.6° The Supreme Court has endorsed the lodestar as the
"guiding light of our fee-shifting jurisprudence.'' 6
1. Presumption against multipliers.
In developing the lodestar method, the Third Circuit envisioned
that courts could increase or decrease the lodestar according to a
number of factors, including the risk of loss and the quality of the at-
torney's work. 2 Shortly afterward, the Fifth Circuit elaborated twelve
factors" to be used in setting reasonable fees, which are sometimes re-
ferred to as the Johnson factors."
57 See Hensley v Eckerhart, 461 US 424, 433 (1983) (explaining, in a case under 42 USC
§ 1988, that "[t]he most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is
the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly
rate. This calculation provides an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the
value of a lawyer's services.").
58 See Lindy Bros Builders, Inc of Philadelphia v American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp, 487 F2d 161, 167-69 (3d Cir 1973) (emphasizing the importance of deciding "the amount
to which attorneys would be entitled on the basis of an hourly rate of compensation applied to
the hours worked. This figure provides the only reasonably objective basis for valuing an attor-
ney's services.").
59 See Hensley, 461 US at 433 (explaining that courts should begin the fee setting by multi-
plying "the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation ... by a reasonable hourly
rate").
60 See Blum v Stenson, 465 US 886, 895 (1984) (stating that "[t]he statute and legislative
history establish that 'reasonable fees' under § 1988 are to be calculated according to the prevail-
ing market rates in the relevant community").
61 City of Burlington v Dague, 505 US 557, 562 (1992) (holding contingency enhancement
of attorneys' fees is not permitted under "typical" federal fee-shifting statutes).
62 See Lindy, 487 F2d at 168 (holding that the district court should consider "the contin-
gent nature of success" and "the quality of an attorney's work ... consider[ing] the complexity
and novelty of the issues presented, the quality of the work that the judge has been able to ob-
serve, and the amount of the recovery obtained").
63 See Johnson v Georgia Highway Express, Inc, 488 F2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir 1974) (enu-
merating factors).
64 The twelve factors are:
1) the time and labor required; 2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; 3) the
skill requisite to perform the legal services properly; 4) the preclusion of other employment
by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; 5) the customary fee; 6) whether the fee is
fixed or contingent; 7) time limitations imposed by the client or other circumstances; 8) the
amount involved and the results obtained; 9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the
attorneys; 10) the "undesirability" of the case; 11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client; and 12) awards in similar cases.
Swedish Hospital Corp v Shalala, 1 F3d 1261, 1266-67 (DC Cir 1993), citing and summarizing
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However, the Supreme Court has strictly limited the use of these
upward adjustments, also known as multipliers, in the context of statu-
61tory fee shifting. In Blum v Stenson, the Court established a strong
presumption that the unenhanced lodestar is the reasonable statutory
fee. Attorneys from the Legal Aid Society of New York brought a civil
rights challenge to the termination of Medicaid benefits on behalf of a
statewide class of recipients.6 After winning summary judgment, the
attorneys applied for fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976.6 They requested a total of $118,968, consisting of
the lodestar amount of $79,312 (for 809 hours of work at rates of $95
to $105 per hour) plus an upward adjustment of fifty percent to reflect
the novelty and complexity of the issues, the quality of representation,
the great benefit obtained for the large class, and the risk of nonpay-
ment.6 The Court held that attorneys applying for fees carry the bur-
den of proving that upward adjustments are necessary to determine a
reasonable fee, and that in this case the attorneys had not supplied the
required proof.6 The Court noted that lodestar enhancements could
be justified "in some cases of exceptional success,,,7 1 so it did not rule
out the possibility, but it made clear that district courts should not
hand them out liberally.
2. Risk multipliers impermissible.
One type of multiplier that has attracted the attention of the Su-
preme Court is the risk multiplier, by which a court would increase the
lodestar to compensate for the possibility of losing the case and there-
fore not recovering any fees. In Blum, the majority explicitly declined
to decide whether multipliers for the risk of loss are ever permissible."
In a concurrence, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, ar-
gued that they should be allowed on the basis of the legislative history
of the statute at issue.72 First, although the legislative history did not
explicitly mention risk multipliers, it cited cases employing risk multi-
Johnson, 488 F2d at 714.
65 465 US 886 (1984).
66 Id at 889-90 (providing background on the suit and on the attorneys representing the
Medicaid recipients).
67 42 USC § 1988.
68 Blun, 465 US at 890-91.
69 Id at 898-99 (referring to the plaintiffs' attorney's brief as "conclusory" and going on to
state that complexity and novelty of the issues are both inappropriate factors to consider in set-
ting the fee award).
70 Id at 897, quoting Hensley v Eckerhart, 461 US 424,435 (1983).
71 See 465 US at 901 n 17 (observing that the Court had "no occasion" to consider the issue
in the case at bar).
72 See id at 902-04 (Brennan concurring) (citing Congress's citation of cases supporting
use of upward adjustment for the risk of loss).
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pliers as examples of the correct calculation of reasonable fees." Sec-
ond, if a reasonable rate is supposed to reflect the prevailing market
rate and therefore enable poor plaintiffs "to attract competent coun-
sel,"'7. risk multipliers should be allowed, since lawyers working in the
marketplace "can be expected to charge a higher hourly rate when
their compensation is contingent on success than when they will be
promptly paid, irrespective of whether they win or lose."75
The Court finally reached the question of risk multipliers in City
of Burlington v Dague6 and held that they are impermissible when
calculating the lodestar under a statutory fee-shifting provision.7 The
Court gave five reasons for its position.
First, using risk multipliers is "double counting" because the lode-
star without enhancement already accounts for the risk of losing a
case, "either in the higher number of hours expended to overcome the
difficulty, or in the higher hourly rate of the attorney skilled and ex-
perienced enough to do so."78
Second, although risk multipliers would increase the incentives to
pursue meritorious claims, they would also indiscriminately raise the
incentives to bring meritless claims.9
Third, risk multipliers contradict the language of fee-shifting stat-
utes that award attorney's fees only to successful or prevailing parties.
Awarding a risk multiplier "would in effect pay for the attorney's time
... in cases where his client does not prevail."'
Fourth, risk multipliers are consistent with the percentage model
but not the lodestar model: attorneys using the percentage method in
the market (by contracting with their clients for contingent fees) ac-
count for risk when setting those fees (and adjust the contract per-
73 See id at 902-03, citing S Rep No 94-1011 at 6 (cited in note 26).
74 S Rep No 94-1011 at 6 (cited in note 26). See also Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976, HR Rep No 94-1558,94th Cong, 2d Sess 9 (1976).
75 Blum, 465 US at 903 (Brennan concurring) (noting that such an approach is also "en-
tirely consistent with the market-based approach to hourly rates").
76 505 US 557 (1992) (regarding fees for suit brought under the Solid Waste Disposal Act
and Federal Water Pollution Control Act).
77 Id at 567 (reversing a court of appeals award of a lodestar enhancement of 25 percent).
78 Id at 562.
79 Id at 563 (giving a mathematical example to show that result).
80 Id at 565. Judge Posner has made a similar argument:
The fundamental problem of a risk bonus is that it compensates attorneys, indirectly but ef-
fectively, for bringing unsuccessful civil rights suits, even though the attorney's fee statute is
expressly limited to cases where the party seeking the fee prevails.... Suppose a plaintiff
asks for and receives a multiplier of 2 because he had a 50 percent chance of losing the case.
This means that if the plaintiff's lawyer tries 10 such cases and wins 5 (as one would expect,
if the risk of loss is indeed 50 percent), he will be paid as if he had won them all; that is, he
will be paid twice his normal charge for each of the 5 cases he won, to compensate him for
getting nothing in the 5 cases he lost.
McKinnon v City of Berwyn, 750 F2d 1383,1392 (7th Cir 1984).
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centage accordingly).81 Therefore, the Court concluded, risk enhance-
ments are a feature of the percentage method; and since the Court has
generally turned away from the percentage method and toward the
lodestar method,8 it should not "engraft this feature onto the lodestar
model" and "concoct a hybrid scheme that resorts to the contingent-
fee model to increase a fee award but not to reduce it.""
Finally, risk multipliers would increase the complexity of setting
fee awards and therefore would increase the possibility of "burden-
some satellite litigation" over fees.4
B. Calculating Fees in Common Fund Cases
An attorney whose work creates a common fund is "entitled to a
reasonable fee ... taken from the fund."' , Unlike in the fee-shifting
context, where the lodestar controls, there are two possible methods
for calculating fees under the common fund doctrine.
1. Percentage or lodestar?
Traditionally, courts awarding fees from common funds employed
the percentage method,s under which the attorneys receive simply a
percentage of the fund that constitutes a "reasonable" fee." The
awards usually range from 20 to 30 percent of the fund," and some
81 See Dague, 505 US at 566 (stating that "attorneys factor in the particular risks of a case
in negotiating their fee and in deciding whether to accept the case").
82 See id at 565-66 (citing earlier decisions and stating that the Court has made this shift
"even though the lodestar model often (perhaps generally) results in a larger fee award").
83 Id at 566 (going on to state that contingency enhancement is inconsistent with the
Court's "general rejection of the contingent-fee model for fee awards" and is unnecessary "to the
determination of a reasonable fee"). The prohibition on court awarded risk multipliers to the
lodestar does not mean that attorneys cannot contract with their clients for fees in excess of the
lodestar. See Venegas v Mitchell, 495 US 82, 86-87 (1990) (holding, in a nonclass action fee-
shifting case under 42 USC § 1988, that the statute did not prohibit contingent fee contract under
which the prevailing plaintiff agreed to pay his attorney more than the statutory amount).
84 Dague, 505 US at 566 (stating that "[c]ontingency enhancement would make the setting
of fees more complex and arbitrary, hence more unpredictable, and hence more litigable").
85 Goldberger v Integrated Resources, Inc, 209 F3d 43, 47 (2d Cir 2000) (referring to this
principle as the "salient exception" to the general rule that litigants must pay their own ex-
penses). See also Boeing Co v Van Gemert, 444 US 472, 478 (1980) (noting that common fund
cases are the exception to the general rule that litigants pay their own expenses and citing nu-
merous court opinions to support this proposition).
86 See Goldberger, 209 F3d at 48 (stating that "[flor much of the 20th century, the percent-
age approach prevailed").
87 See Paul, Johnson, Alson & Hunt v Graulty, 886 F2d 268, 272 (9th Cir 1989) (determin-
ing under the specific facts of the case that it would be "impractical, if not impossible" to deter-
mine the number of hours worked by the attorneys, as required under the lodestar method).
88 See In re Washington Public Power Supply System Securities Litigation, 19 F3d 1291,
1297 (9th Cir 1994) (noting that the district court "acknowledged Class Counsel's central propo-
sition that a fee in the range of 20-40 percent is typical in many common fund cases"); Swedish
Hospital Corp v Shalala, 1 F3d 1261, 1272 (DC Cir 1993) (stating "[t]he twenty percent figure is
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courts have adopted benchmarks in this range, such as 25 percent, for
setting fees.'
In the 1970s, many courts began to view the percentage method
as problematic because it generated windfalls for attorneys in cases
with exceptionally large funds. Some courts avoided this problem by
reducing the percentage awarded. However, this exposed the method
to criticism as unprincipled.9
In response to these criticisms, the Third Circuit developed the
lodestar method in 1973,"' initiating a general movement oward it.9
As they did under fee-shifting provisions before Blum and Dague,
courts under the common fund doctrine have enhanced the lodestar
by subjective factors such as "the risk of the litigation and the per-
formance of the attorneys."93
The lodestar method turned out to be more difficult to apply than
first envisioned. In 1985, a Third Circuit task force evaluated the lode-
star method and listed nine problems that judges and practitioners
had experienced with it:9 (1) calculating the lodestar was a time- and
effort-intensive process that increased the workload of the courts and
sapped resources;5 (2) the lodestar calculation was "insufficiently ob-
jective" and produced widely inconsistent results;" (3) the calculation
created a false "sense of mathematical precision that is unwarranted
well within the range of reasonable fees in common fund cases... A majority of common fund
class action fee awards fall between twenty and thirty percent").
89 See, for example, Paul, 886 F2d at 272 (adopting 25 percent as a benchmark). See also
Federal Judicial Center, Manual for Complex Litigation § 24.121 at 189 (cited in note 20) (citing
range of 25 to 30 percent and collecting examples).
90 The percentage is set using the "same 'less objective' factors that are used to determine
the multiplier for the lodestar." Goldberger, 209 F3d at 47, quoting Brown v Phillips Petroleum
Co, 838 F2d 451,454-55 (10th Cir 1988).
91 See Lindy Bros Builders, Inc of Philadelphia v American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp, 487 F2d 161,167 (3d Cir 1973) (holding that "an hourly rate of compensation applied to
the hours worked ... provides the only reasonably objective basis for valuing an attorney's ser-
vices"). See Part II.A for discussion of the lodestar and its origin.
92 See, for example, City of Detroit v Grinnell Corp, 495 F2d 448, 469, 471 (2d Cir 1974)
(noting that the percentage approach often produces an improper "golden harvest of fees" and
holding that only the lodestar method was sufficiently objective to be legitimate).
93 Goldberger, 209 F3d at 47.
94 See Court Awarded Attorneys Fees: Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 FRD 237,
246 (3d Cir 1985). As commentators have noted, the credibility of the lodestar is severely un-
dermined because the circuit that promulgated its use has now become its leading critic. See, for
example, Coffee, 86 Colum L Rev at 675 (cited in note 24) (stating "[e]ven the Third Circuit,
which originally authored the 'lodestar' fee award formula that now prevails in federal courts,
reexamined its own invention in 1985 and found it seriously deficient and subject to abuse").
95 See Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 FRD at 246 (stating that "[t]he increased docu-
mentation demanded ... the practice of conducting fee hearings ... and the desire to avoid mis-
feasance have so magnified the process that the system's human and physical resources are being
deflected from other, perhaps more important, duties").
96 Id at 246-47 (stating that this problem led to a loss of predictability and "loss of confi-
dence in the integrity of the fee-setting procedure").
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in terms of the realities of the practice of law";W (4) judges manipu-
lated the lodestar calculation by first deciding the percentage or dollar
amount to be awarded and then adjusting the multipliers to reach the
desired result;" (5) attorneys abused the lodestar system by "running
the meter," working unnecessary hours and inflating billing rates;" (6)
attorneys also abused the lodestar system by prolonging litigation in
order to increase billable hours;"' (7) the calculation did not provide
flexibility in needed areas, such as rewarding lawyers for early settle-
ment;'°' (8) the public interest bar, especially civil rights lawyers, felt
that lodestars in cases producing monetary recovery were systemati-
cally set higher than in cases generating nonmonetary relief;"' and (9)
the lodestar method involved many administrative difficulties, such as
which community courts should consider in determining the normal
billing rate an attorney commands.'
While the task force disclaimed the ability to evaluate the empiri-
cal strength of these criticisms,' it recommended that the lodestar be
used in statutory fee cases but that the percentage method be used in
common fund cases.' The task force recommended this because the
lodestar (to be used in statutory fee cases) "is reasonably objective,
neutral, and does not require making monetary assessments of intan-
gible rights that are not easily equated with dollars and cents," but
these protections were unnecessary in the common fund context be-
97 Id at 247 (noting, for example, that many plaintiffs' attorneys work through contingent
fee arrangements and therefore have no actual customary billing rate to be used in the calcula-
tion).
98 Id (noting that "Lindy [which set forth the lodestar method] is subject to manipulation
by judges who prefer to calibrate fees in terms of percentages of the settlement fund or the
amounts recovered by the plaintiffs or of an overall dollar amount").
99 Id at 247-48 (stating "Lindy encourages lawyers to expend excessive hours ... engage in
duplicative and unjustified work, inflate their 'normal' billing rate, and include fictitious hours or
hours already billed on other matters, perhaps in the hope of offsetting any hours the court may
disallow").
100 Id at 248 (stating that "Lindy creates a disincentive for the early settlement of cases...
[and a] desire to keep the litigation alive despite a reasonable prospect of settlement, to maxi-
mize the number of hours to be included in computing the lodestar").
101 Id (finding that the "preoccupation with the lodestar computation deprives the trial
court of much needed discretion to take proper account of the variousness of litigation," but also
noting that greater discretion would contribute to concerns about the lack of uniformity and
"contribute to the concerns of the public interest bar").
102 Id at 248-49 (stating that "[t]he claim is that lodestars in the so-called 'money' cases,
such as securities and antitrust actions, are set higher than they are in cases under statutes pro-
moting nonmonetary social objectives, such as the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976").
103 Id at 249 (questioning whether the rate should be national or local, and if local, whether
"the forum's rate or each petitioning attorney's local rate" should be used).
104 Id at 246 (but also acknowledging a "widespread belief that the deficiencies ... either
offset or exceed its benefits").
105 Id at 255.
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cause the fund was usually sizeable.'" Since then, the percentage
method has made a comeback. The Eleventh and D.C. Circuits have
gone so far as to mandate use of the percentage method in common
fund cases."'
Of the other circuit courts that have addressed the choice be-
tween the methods, only the Fifth Circuit mandates the lodestar '
(with an upward or downward adjustment depending on the Johnson
twelve-factor analysis"). The rest have left the choice to the discretion
of the district courts,"0 but several of these incline toward the percent-
age approach."' For example, the Tenth Circuit has held that "either
method is permissible," but there is a "preference for the percentage
of the fund method."..2 And in circuits that leave discretion to the dis-
106 Id.
107 See Swedish Hospital Corp, 1 F3d at 1272 (stating "we conclude that percentage-of-the-
fund is the proper method for calculating fees in a common fund case"); Camden I Condomin-
ium Association, Inc v Dunkle, 946 F2d 768,774 (11th Cir 1991) ("[W]e believe that the percent-
age of the fund approach is the better reasoned in a common fund case.").
108 See Longden v Sunderman, 979 F2d 1095, 1099-1100 & n 9 (5th Cir 1992) (stating that
"[this circuit utilizes the 'lodestar method,"' and noting that the Fifth Circuit "has yet to adopt"
the percentage approach in common fund cases).
109 See Johnson v Georgia Highway Express, Inc, 488 F2d 714,717-19 (5th Cir 1974) (listing
the factors and reminding courts they "do not have a mandate ... to make the prevailing counsel
rich"); Lyn-Lea Travel Corp v American Airlines, Inc, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 14487, *31-32 (N D
Tex) (applying the Johnson factors and determining that none required an adjustment in the
lodestar).
110 See, for example, Weinberger v Great Northern Nekoosa Corp, 925 F2d 518,526 n 10 (1st
Cir 1991) (commenting on the "tendency exhibited by some courts, particularly in common fund
cases, to jettison the lodestar in favor of a 'reasonable percent of the fund' approach," but finding
it inappropriate for the specific facts of the case); Mazola v May Department Stores Co, 1999 WL
1261312, *3-4 (D Mass) (applying the percentage approach); Goldberger, 209 F3d at 49 (collect-
ing decisions of six other circuits that have "reaffirmed that district courts enjoy the discretion to
use either the lodestar or the percentage method" in common fund cases; adopting this position
with the caveat that courts should avoid "unwarranted windfalls for attorneys"); In re Agent Or-
ange Product Liability Litigation, 818 F2d 226, 237 (2d Cir 1987) (noting that district courts are
"given broad discretion" in setting fee awards); Rawlings v Prudential-Bache Properties, Inc, 9
F3d 513, 515-16 (6th Cir 1993) (citing the "recent trend towards adoption of a percentage of the
fund method" in common fund cases and listing cases adopting the approach); Cook v Niedert,
142 F3d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir 1998) (asserting that "a district judge has discretion to use either [the
lodestar or percentage] method, depending on the particular circumstances of the case"); Cash-
man v Allied Products Corp, 761 F2d 1250, 1255-56 (8th Cir 1985) (noting that a district court
has significant discretion in fixing a reasonable fee); Washington Public Power, 19 F3d at 1296
(noting that in common fund cases there is no presumption in favor of either method, that the
district court has discretion to choose between them, and that the fundamental guiding principle
is that fees be reasonable under the circumstances); Florida v Dunne, 915 F2d 542, 545 (9th Cir
1990) (requiring "only that fee awards in common fund cases be reasonable under the circum-
stances. Accordingly, either the lodestar or the percentage-of-the-fund approach" may be used.).
Ill See In re General Motors Corp Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation,
55 F3d 768, 821 (3d Cir 1995) (stating that, while courts may use the lodestar method in some
nonstatutory fee cases, they "must vigilantly guard against he lodestar's potential to exacerbate
the misalignment of the attorneys' and the class's interests").
112 Gottlieb v Barry, 43 F3d 474,483 (10th Cir 1994).
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trict courts, the district courts employ the percentage method more
frequently than the lodestar."'
2. Lodestar multipliers in pure common fund cases.
Most courts have concluded that applying risk multipliers to the
lodestar in pure common fund cases is appropriate after Dague."' A
few courts, however, have refused to apply risk multipliers in common
fund cases."' The majority approach best reconciles the text of the fee-
shifting statutes, the purpose of the common fund doctrine, and the
policy arguments offered in Dague itself.
Even though there is no applicable fee-shifting statute in a pure
common fund case, at first cut, some of the Dague Court's reasons for
prohibiting risk multipliers might seem to apply with equal strength in
the common fund context. Inclusion of a risk factor might lead to
double counting because risk should already be reflected in the hourly
rate and/or number of hours spent on the case."6 Risk multipliers
might encourage excessive unmeritorious suits, as well as satellite liti-
gation over fees."7
On the other hand, not all of the Dague reasons for the prohibi-
tion on risk multipliers extend to lodestar fee awards from common
113 See Brytus v Spang & Co, 203 F3d 238, 243 (3d Cir 2000) (stating "[alttorney's fees un-
der the common fund doctrine may be calculated using the lodestar method but more frequently
such fees have been awarded using the percentage-of-recovery method").
114 See In re The Prudential Insurance Co ofAmerica Sales Practices Litigation, 148 F3d 283,
341 n 121 (3d Cir 1998) (dictum) (but noting that "[even if] multipliers for risk or counsel's ex-
pertise are appropriate in the lodestar cross-check in common fund cases, they require particular
scrutiny and justification"); Longden v Sunderman, 979 F2d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir 1992) (stating
that despite trends in other circuits, the Fifth Circuit uses the lodestar method "computed by
multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the prevailing hourly rate in the com-
munity for similar work"); Rawlings v Prudential-Bache Properties, Inc, 9 F3d 513, 517 (6th Cir
1993) (upholding district court decision using the "lodestar-multiplier method"); Cook v Niedert,
142 F3d 1004, 1013 (7th Cir 1998) (allocating discretion to district court to select multiplier in de-
cision using lodestar method); Florin v Nationsbank of Georgia, N.A., 34 F3d 560,564-65 (7th Cir
1994) (concluding Dague "applies only to statutory fee-shifting cases" by its terms and because
the policy concerns that weigh against risk multipliers in statutory fee-shifting cases do not apply
to common fund cases); Washington Public Power Supply System Securities Litigation, 19 F3d
1291, 1299 (9th Cir 1994) (stating "Dague's rationale for barring risk multipliers in statutory fee
cases does not operate to bar risk multipliers in common fund cases").
115 See In re Nineteen Appeals Arising Out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litiga-
tion, 982 F2d 603, 620 (1 st Cir 1992) (Lay concurring) (stating that "[a]s Dague makes clear, use
of the lodestar method ... should not include a multiplier for contingency reasons"); In re Gen-
eral Motors Corp Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation, 55 F3d 768,822 (3d Cir
1995) (stating in dictum that courts cannot use risk multipliers in the common fund context after
Dague).
116 See Dague, 505 US at 562-63.
117 See id at 563, 566. But see Peter-Christian Olivo, Comment, No More Times Tables: Risk
Multipliers in Attorneys' Fee Awards after In Re Bolar Pharmaceutical Co, 77 Minn L Rev 893,
913-17 (1993) (arguing that risk multipliers should be allowed because omitting them under-
compensates attorneys for taking risky cases).
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funds. First, in a pure common fund case there is no relevant statutory
language requiring that only successful plaintiffs be compensated, so
at least the payment for work on unsuccessful cases as well as success-
ful ones does not actually violate a statute (even if it does encourage
some undesirable unmeritorious litigation)."' Second, the Dague
Court rejected the use of risk multipliers in the fee-shifting context
only. Courts have not abandoned the percentage method in common
fund cases, so even if risk multipliers are a feature of the percentage
method, using them in the common fund context would not be im-
proper (as opposed to the fee-shifting context, where courts employ
the lodestar exclusively).
Finally, beyond the Dague arguments, the purposes of statutory
fee shifting and the common fund doctrine differ. Fee shifting, accord-
ing to the legislative history, exists simply to eliminate the bias in favor
of clients with the means to pay; so it should be limited to the market
value of the work an attorney has expended on a case, independent of
the size of the clients' recovery. The common fund doctrine is meant
to compensate attorneys proportionately to the benefit they have con-
ferred on their clients; so it should depend on the size of the clients'
recovery. The vast majority of courts have reached the correct conclu-
sion.
Despite the increased popularity of the percentage of the fund
approach, the application of Dague's ban on risk multipliers in the
common fund context is an important issue. Even when courts award
fees under the percentage method, they often crosscheck their result
using an enhanced lodestar.
The percentage method often generates much higher fees than
the unenhanced lodestar."9 However, courts have enabled high per-
centage awards to survive the lodestar crosscheck by adjusting the
lodestar with multipliers to about the same award that the percentage
method produces. If risk multipliers are inappropriate in the common
fund context, rationalizing percentage awards with lodestar cross-
checks could become much more difficult.
In summary, while risk multipliers to the lodestar are inappropri-
ate in the fee-shifting context after Dague, they may be appropriate in
the common fund context. We now turn to the problem this Comment
addresses: how to meet the demands of a fee-shifting statute and also
satisfy the requirements of the common fund doctrine.
118 See Part I.B for a discussion of the equitable basis of the common fund doctrine.
119 See Brytus v Spang & Ca, 203 F3d 238,247 (3d Cir 2000) (noting that in some cases the
percentage method may result in a higher recovery than the lodestar (this is logical, especially if
the class's award is huge)). But see Dague, 505 US at 566 (stating that "the lodestar model often
(perhaps, generally) results in a larger fee award" than the percentage method because it may
cause lawyers to run up hours unnecessarily).
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III. THE SETTLEMENT INCENTIVE PROBLEM IN HYBRID CASES
How should fees be calculated in hybrid cases (class actions initi-
ated under fee-shifting statutes, but settling or reaching judgment to
create a common fund)? Should the statute or the equitable doctrine
control? Can the rules be structured to give attorneys appropriate in-
centives to pursue settlement aggressively without compromising their
clients' interests? To understand the improper incentives that might be
created under the current system, it is useful to compare how attor-
neys' fees in a hybrid case are affected by the two possible scenarios:
(1) settling the case; or (2) litigating it to judgment.
A. Hybrid Cases That Settle, Creating a Common Fund
When a hybrid case settles, the fee-shifting provision is not neces-
sarily activated, since neither party may have prevailed in a legal
sense.'2° The defendant creates a common fund in exchange for release
from liability, leaving the court in charge of distributing it. Under the
common fund doctrine, district courts in the majority of the circuits
have discretion over the method of calculation, while the Fifth Circuit
requires the lodestar and the Eleventh and D.C. Circuits mandate the
percentage method.12' However, since a majority of courts still employ
lodestar multipliers in the common fund context, the percentage and
lodestar methods result in approximately the same fees.2
B. Hybrid Cases That Reach Judgment, Creating a Common Fund
When the class in a hybrid case actually wins a judgment, it is un-
clear whether the court should award fees under the fee-shifting stat-
ute (lodestar without multipliers) or the common fund doctrine (per-
centage of recovery or, basically equivalent, lodestar with multipliers)
120 There is some possibility that a court might award statutory fees to one of the settling
parties if the court considers one of the parties to have substantially prevailed. See Part I.A.2.
See also Da-Wai Hu, Comment, Running the Caucus-Race: Prevailing Parties and Fee Shifting
Under ERISA, 67 U Chi L Rev 217, 226-29 (2000) (explaining how settling plaintiffs can some-
times be considered prevailing parties for purposes of the ERISA fee-shifting provision). In
these cases, fees could theoretically be awarded under the statute instead of, or in addition to, the
fees awarded under the common fund doctrine. This would remove the disproportionate incen-
tive to settle (because either settling or trying the case could lead to statutory fees), but then at-
torneys would discriminate against bringing hybrid cases in favor of pure common fund cases
See Part III.B.
121 See Part II.B.
122 See Newberg and Conte, 3 Newberg on Class Actions § 14.03 at 14-4-5 (cited in note 19)
(noting that "[clourts applying the lodestar approach [in the common fund context] will often
use large multipliers or monetary enhancements of the time/rate (lodestar) calculation in order
to reach fee award results comparable to percentage of recovery fees. Multiples ranging from
one to four frequently are awarded in common fund cases" and even greater multiples may be
employed if the fund is especially large.).
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or both. The primary reason for this uncertainty is a striking paucity of
cases involving both common funds and fee-shifting statutes that have
actually resulted in a judgment on the merits. Although at first pass
that might suggest hat the proper method of calculation is a relatively
unimportant and obscure point of law, it is also entirely consistent
with the argument that uncertainty over the ability of courts to sup-
plement attorneys' fees out of the common fund in hybrid cases has
resulted in too many settlements.
Currently, the Third Circuit is the only federal appellate court
that has addressed the issue of how attorneys' fees are calculated in a
hybrid class action. In Brytus v Spang & Co,12 attorneys won a
$12,500,000 judgment on behalf of a class of retirees against their for-
mer employer, which had violated ERISA by failing to distribute to
them surplus assets of a pension plan.'2' The plaintiffs sought attor-
neys' fees under the fee-shifting provision of ERISA,'25 and the plain-
tiffs' attorneys also requested fees from the common fund.'2 Since the
plaintiffs had clearly prevailed and therefore fee shifting was appro-
priate, the district court had two options: award fees under the statute
only (unenhanced lodestar), or under both the statute and the com-
mon fund doctrine (percentage or enhanced lodestar).
The district court ordered the defendant to pay $460,000 in fees
under the statute, but declined to award anything from the common
fund because it "believed counsel had already been reasonably com-
pensated."'127 The attorneys contested this award in the Third Circuit,
arguing that they should have been entitled to total fees in the range
of $3,000,000 under the common fund doctrine (calculating a 20 to 30
percent fee). "
The Third Circuit held that the district court had not abused its
discretion in limiting the award to the lodestar under the fee-shifting
statute.29 However, the court noted that the availability of a fee-
shifting provision did not totally foreclose use of the common fund
doctrine in a hybrid case that reaches a judgment." It explained that
123 203 F3d 238 (3d Cir 2000).
124 Id at 240-41.
125 29 USC § 1132(g)(1).
126 Brytus, 203 F3d at 241 (explaining counsel's fee proposal).
127 Id at 243, 245 (going on to dismiss counsel's contention that the trial court believed it
lacked the authority to grant the full fee request). The trial court version of Brytus resulted only
in a slip opinion. See In re Spang & Co Litigation, Nos 88-1548,91-1041, slip op at 2 (W D Pa July
14, 1997).
128 Brytus, 203 F3d at 241, 243 (noting the attorneys' assertion that the district court should
have awarded the lodestar under the statute, plus the percentage of the fund minus the lodestar
award, so as to avoid double compensation).
129 Id at 247 (stating "the District Court here did not abuse its discretion in declining to
award additional fees to be taken from the ERISA recovery under the common fund doctrine").
130 Id (stating that "[t]his is not to say that the common fund doctrine may never be applied
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additional fees might be drawn from the fund if the defendant is in-
solvent, or if the plaintiffs' attorneys show that the plaintiffs could not
have obtained competent counsel in the private market for the lode-
star amount.'
Limiting the common fund doctrine to extraordinary circum-
stances in hybrid cases, as the Brytus court did, could cause a signifi-
cant problem: a disproportionate incentive to settle class actions, re-
gardless of the best interests of the plaintiff class. The attorneys in
Brytus raised this argument," 2 and the court answered it by suggesting
that district courts administering hybrid case settlements should cross-
check the percentage calculation with the lodestar to ensure that the
fee is reasonable. 33 But this solution seems flawed. When calculating
the lodestar under the common fund doctrine (against which to cross-
check the percentage fee), a majority of courts use multipliers,"" which
they cannot use in the simple fee-shifting context. The lodestar with
multipliers is likely to be much closer to the percentage fee than the
unenhanced lodestar. Thus, crosschecking the percentage with the en-
hanced lodestar will probably not produce many reductions in the fees
drawn from settlement funds under the common fund doctrine.
As the dissent in Brytus recognized, the possibility of a percent-
age award at settlement but a "substantially smaller" lodestar award
at judgment "creates a compelling incentive for the plaintiffs' counsel
to settle.'' . Agency problems already plague class actions." The in-
in a case for which there is a statutory fee provision and which goes to judgment").
131 Id (noting in dicta that the common fund doctrine could be applied "when the defendant
responsible for the statutory fee has become bankrupt or otherwise has insufficient funds[,] ...
when there has been a showing that competent counsel could not have been obtained for that
case or that line of cases," or in "other possible situations").
132 See id at 246 (noting the attorneys' argument "that the District Court penalized them for
proceeding to judgment, which resulted in the award of a statutory fee, whereas they would have
been entitled to a fee under the common fund doctrine had they accepted a settlement").
133 Id at 247 (saying the disparity "will be minimized" if these steps are taken).
134 See notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
135 203 F3d at 248-49 (Stapleton dissenting) (expressing concern "about the practical
implications" of the majority's opinion).
136 See id at 249 (noting that the incentive to settle increases "the already significant conflict
of interest between plaintiff class members and their counsel"). See also Ortiz v Fibreboard
Corp, 527 US 815,851-53 (1999) (noting pressures to settle class actions after certification); Janet
Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43
Stan L Rev 497,536 (1991) (noting that class actions "are characterized by high agency costs: that
is, a significant possibility that litigation decisions will be made in accordance with the lawyer's
economic interests rather than those of the class"); Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P Miller,
The Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U Chi L Rev 1,19-27 (1991) (discussing monitoring, incentive,
and other agency costs that arise in class action and derivative litigation); Coffee, 86 Colum L
Rev at 714 (cited in note 24) (stating "[o]ften, the plaintiff's attorneys and the defendants can
settle on a basis that is adverse to the interests of the plaintiffs. At its worst, the settlement proc-
ess may amount to a covert exchange of a cheap settlement for a high award of attorney's fees.").
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credible amount of work required to try a massive, complicated class
action provides a huge incentive to settle before judgment in any
event. If actually winning a judgment for the plaintiff class lowers the
likelihood of a common fund award, so that only the least lucrative
option (the unenhanced lodestar) remains, the agency problems are
exacerbated.'3 Attorneys' self-interest may persist over their clients'
interests, resulting in few class actions that actually reach judgment. It
seems fair to infer that the reason there has been so little discussion of
this problem in judicial opinions is the lack of opportunities for judges
to write opinions confronting the problem, as plaintiffs' attorneys set-
tle in their own best interests at the expense of the classes they pur-
port to represent.
It is true that settlements are generally desirable because they
avoid expensive litigation and because the parties can presumably fix
their own solution better than the judicial system could through a
trial.'8 However, the desire of plaintiffs' attorneys to obtain higher
fees at the expense of their clients is not a legitimate reason to in-
crease the rate of settlements further, especially considering the al-
ready significant reasons why plaintiffs' attorneys may wish to settle
class actions quickly. Neither is it a legitimate reason to decrease the
amount of recovery for which plaintiffs' attorneys are willing to set-
tl e .' '
9
IV. A SOLUTION TO THE SETTLEMENT INCENTIVE PROBLEM
This Part considers four possible solutions to the settlement in-
centive problem of Brytus. Any solution to the skewed incentive prob-
lem must equalize the potential results of settlement and judgment"'
and remain faithful to the purpose of the fee-shifting statutes, which is
to attract competent counsel for meritorious claims.4' There are four
possible ways to equalize the expected results of judgment to match
137 In circuits where the percentage method is mandatory (D.C. and Eleventh) for common
fund fee awards, the incentive to settle is even greater than in most circuits (where courts can
choose between percentage and lodestar with multipliers) because settling guarantees the per-
centage method, which may be slightly more predictable than the lodestar with multipliers.
138 See In re General Motors Corp Pick-Up Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation, 55 F3d
768, 784 (3d Cir 1995) (noting that "the law favors settlements" to conserve judicial resources).
But see Alexander, 43 Stan L Rev at 499 (cited in note 136) (arguing that "a significant and iden-
tifiable class of settlements [in securities class actions] is in reality neither voluntary nor accurate
... in that the strength of the case on the merits has little or nothing to do with determining the
amount of the settlement").
139 See note 14 and accompanying text.
140 See Brytus, 203 F3d at 249 (Stapleton dissenting) (reasoning that "the method of award-
ing attorneys' fees should not turn on the manner in which the case is resolved"). Some disincen-
tive to try class actions would still exist, because of the time and effort required for a trial, but at
least the disincentive would not be artificially intensified.
141 See notes 25-26.
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those of settlement: (1) construe any settlement as evidence that the
plaintiff class has "prevailed" or "succeeded," thus triggering the rele-
vant fee-shifting statute; (2) crosscheck the percentage fee at settle-
ment with the unenhanced lodestar and reduce the percentage to
match the lodestar; (3) allow risk multipliers to increase the lodestar
under fee-shifting statutes in hybrid cases; or (4) establish a presump-
tion that recovery from the common fund is warranted along with the
statutory lodestar amount (this option would run contrary to Brytus,
which established the opposite presumption). As explained below, the
presumption in favor of recovery from the common fund best recon-
ciles the purpose of fee-shifting statutes and the class action device.
A. Courts Should Not Extend Fee-Shifting Statutes to the
Settlement Context
One possible solution is to treat all settling plaintiffs as "prevail-
ing" or "successful," so that whether a hybrid case is settled or tried,
the fee-shifting statute controls. But there are several reasons why
courts should not adopt this possible solution. First, automatically
construing all settlements as evidence that the plaintiff class has pre-
vailed for purposes of statutory fee shifting would generate factually
incorrect results. It would be an overbroad rule, sweeping in cases in
which the plaintiff has not achieved her objectives in bringing suit. For
example, the settlement of a nuisance suit does not justify giving the
plaintiff prevailing party status.' Since a plaintiff who settles has not
necessarily achieved her original objectives in the litigation, it should
not automatically show that she has prevailed.
Second, this solution would limit the recovery at settlement to the
unenhanced lodestar, equalizing the expected values of settlement and
judgment at the lower (judgment) level and representing a return to
the unenhanced lodestar across the board. In many cases, this would
reduce attorneys' incentive to bring cases governed by fee-shifting
statutes as class actions; instead, attorneys would prefer to pursue
claims on behalf of individual clients.
For example, if an employer had improperly withheld benefits
from a large number of employees, bringing the claims separately
would allow attorneys to earn the lodestar for work on an individual
case many times over. Bringing all the claims together as a class action
would generate a larger lodestar than the lodestar in an individual
case because of the greater time required to prepare a class action.
However, in many cases it would be smaller than the individual lode-
star multiplied by the number of plaintiffs (especially if this number
142 See note 40 and accompanying text.
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were huge), because of economies of scale. Therefore, awarding the
unenhanced lodestar at both settlement and judgment would discour-
age the aggregation of plaintiffs into classes in cases governed by fee-
shifting statutes.
It might be argued that discouraging aggregation is beneficial, be-
cause in setting the fee-shifting recovery at a specific level (the unen-
hanced lodestar), Congress intended to encourage a specific amount
of litigation under statutes with fee-shifting provisions. On this view,
recovery should be limited to the congressionally specified level be-
cause any increase would generate more litigation than Congress
wished to enable. But the Supreme Court has held (outside the class
action context) that nothing in 42 USC § 1988 or its legislative history
prohibits a lawyer from collecting a fee higher than the statutory
amount.'43 So the statutory amount sets a minimum rather than a
maximum fee.
Thus, it is unlikely that Congress intended to enable a calibrated
amount of litigation through statutory fee shifting. However, assuming
that is true, the class action device does not necessarily enable more
plaintiffs to recover than Congress contemplated. In many situations,
class actions enable litigation when many people would each be enti-
tled to a small recovery, none of which would individually be worth an
attorney's labor." Absent the class action device, none of these plain-
tiffs at all would be able to take advantage of the fee-shifting statutes.
In addition, even if class actions allow somewhat more recovery
than Congress intended, the benefits of the class action device likely
exceed the costs of excess recovery. Aggregation of claims produces
great judicial economy gains by resolving all of a defendant's liabilities
in a single action and eliminating multiple trials on the same issues.'
Discouraging the aggregation of claims into class actions forgoes these
judicial economy gains on the basis of dubious congressional intent. In
summary, this potential solution suffers from a number of problems,
and courts should not adopt it.
143 See Venegas v Mitchell, 495 US 82,86-87 (1990) (stating that "there is nothing in [§ 1988]
to regulate what plaintiffs may or may not promise to pay their attorneys if they lose or if they
win," that § 1988 does not prohibit "the plaintiff from promising an attorney a percentage of any
money judgment that may be recovered," and that nothing "in the legislative history ... per-
suades us that Congress intended § 1988 to limit civil rights plaintiffs' freedom to contract [for
contingent fees] with their attorneys").
144 See Amchem Products, Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591, 617 (1997) (discussing how class ac-
tions overcome these collective action problems).
145 See General Telephone Co of the Southwest v Falcon, 457 US 147,159 (1982) (reversing a
class certification because it "did not advance the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a
principal purpose of the procedure") (internal quotations omitted).
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B. Courts Should Not Reduce Percentage Fees at Settlement to
Match the Unenhanced Lodestar
This solution would produce the same effect as the first solution.
It would equalize fees at settlement and judgment at the level of the
unenhanced lodestar. It would also generate the same basic problem: a
disincentive to aggregate claims into class actions, based on a doubtful
congressional "intent" to cap fees at the statutory amount.' Thus,
courts should not adopt it.
C. Courts Should Not Allow Risk Multipliers to Enhance the
Lodestar in Hybrid Cases
The third possibility, allowing risk multipliers in calculating the
lodestar under the statutory provision (in hybrid cases only, not in
simple fee-shifting statutory cases), has the advantage of preserving
the plaintiffs' attorney's dedication to his clients and adversarial rela-
tionship with the defendant throughout the trial, including the fee-
setting phase.
Despite this significant advantage, there are serious objections to
this option. First, it would contradict Dague's explicit rejection of risk
multipliers in the statutory fee-shifting context.'7 Second, it would
contradict the language of many fee-shifting provisions, which prohibit
courts from effectively compensating attorneys for work on cases in
which they did not prevail."
Dague might be distinguishable because it was not a class action.
It is arguable that the preservation of the plaintiff class-attorney rela-
tionship is significant enough to override the disadvantages of risk
multipliers with which the Dague Court was concerned. However, this
argument does nothing to confront the fact that allowing risk multi-
pliers would contradict the plain language of fee-shifting statutory
provisions. Thus, courts should not adopt this possible solution.
D. Courts Should Create a Presumption of Ordinary Percentage
Recovery
The best option is to establish a presumption that fees totaling an
ordinary percentage recovery (20 to 30 percent of the fund) should be
awarded under both the fee-shifting provision and the common fund
doctrine, with money from the fund making up the difference between
the statutory unenhanced lodestar and the 20 or 30 percent bench-
146 See Part IV.A.
147 See Dague, 505 US at 567 (reversing a lodestar enhancement of 25 percent).
148 See, for example, the statutes listed in note 22.
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mark. ' The presumption could be defeated if the fund were extraor-
dinarily large, and thus generated enormous fees.
Two problems with this solution are that it turns the plaintiffs' at-
torney into the plaintiffs' adversary during fee-setting and that it in-
creases the potential for excessive fees. But these problems are no
worse than those courts encounter during the settlement of hybrid
cases, so they should be manageable. A third possible objection is that
this solution could skew attorneys' incentives to pursue statutory fee-
shifting claims as class actions rather than as individual actions. How-
ever, this justifies the solution rather than defeating it. As indicated in
Part IV.A, class actions save judicial resources. Also, the argument that
class actions permit more recovery than Congress intended 
is weak. °
In addition, the purposes of statutory fee shifting and the com-
mon fund doctrine support the idea that fee-shifting provisions should
not preempt additional equitable awards. Fee-shifting provisions exist
to ensure that attorneys are compensated with at least the lodestar
amount, eliminating the bias against taking the cases of poor plain-
tiffs.'" These provisions should be taken as setting a minimum fee. Un-
der the common fund doctrine the attorney is additionally entitled to
a reward proportionate to the benefit obtained for the class. As a mat-
ter of equity, there is no reason why the attorney's fees should be lim-
ited to the statutory lodestar minimum if the benefit conferred on the
plaintiffs exceeds that minimum. Overall, establishing a presumption
of fee availability under both the statute and the common fund doc-
trine is probably a better way to equalize settlement and judgment fee
potential, and to remove extra incentives to avoid judgment, than is
the allowance of risk multipliers.'2 Finally, presuming a full percentage
fee in hybrid cases, regardless of whether they are settled or tried,
would remove any incentive attorneys may have to discriminate
against hybrid cases." '
149 This was the award requested by the attorneys in Brytus. See 203 F3d at 243-44 (ex-
plaining the attorneys' fee request and argument that "since the result of the litigation was to
create a common pension fund for the benefit of all plaintiff class members, they are entitled to
additional fees based on the common fund doctrine").
150 See Part IVA.
151 See notes 25-26.
152 There is a possibility that in a similar future case, if the anti-Brytus presumption has not
been established, attorneys who have learned from Brytus will simply not invoke the fee-shifting
provision (in order to avoid being limited to it). This would force the court to apply the equitable
doctrine alone; but the court could reduce the equitably awarded fee by the unenhanced lode-
star, thus requiring the attorneys to request fees under the statute in order to recover the full
benchmark percentage amount.
153 See Part III.B.
2001] 1033
1034 The University of Chicago Law Review [68:1007
CONCLUSION
The current interpretation of the boundary between statutory
fee-shifting provisions and the common fund doctrine established in
Brytus skews plaintiffs' attorneys' incentives unacceptably toward set-
tlement rather than trial in hybrid cases. Courts should instead estab-
lish a presumption that the percentage calculation provides the
benchmark for recovery in hybrid cases. Although strong settlement
incentives would remain, the percentage approach would not aggra-
vate them excessively, as the Brytus lodestar presumption does.
